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CCC enrollees throughout the country were credited with
renewing the nation's decimated forests by planting an
estimated three billion trees from 1933 to 1942.
President
Roosevelt wastes no time
 The 1932 Presidential election was more a cry
for help from a desperate people near panic as it was an
election in a "landslide" vote, the nation turned to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Democratic party searching for
an end to the rampant unemployment and economic chaos that
gripped the country. They weren't disappointed. Accepting the
Presidential nomination on July 1, 1932, New York Governor
Roosevelt planned a fight against soil erosion and declining
timber resources, utilizing the unemployed of large urban
areas.
Professional foresters and interested layman
raised these claims. In what would later be called "The
Hundred Days," President Roosevelt revitalized the faith of
the nation with several measures, one of which was the Emergency
Conservation Work (ECW) Act, more commonly known as the Civilian
Conservation Corps. With this action, he brought together two
wasted resources, the young men and the land, in an effort to
save both.
The President wasted no time: He called the 73rd Congress
into Emergency Session on March 9, 1933, to hear and authorize
his program. He proposed to recruit thousands of unemployed
young men, enroll them in a peacetime army, and send them into
battle against destruction and erosion of our natural resources.
Before it was over, over three million young men engaged in a
massive salvage operation, the most popular experiment
of the New Deal.
The strongest reaction to the proposed CCC
program was from organized labor. Its leaders feared a loss of
jobs that could be filled with union members. They also looked
with alarm at the involvement of the Army believing it might
lead to regimentation of labor.
Senate Bill 5.598 was introduced in March 27,
was through both houses of Congress on the President's desk to
be signed on March 31, 1933.
Roosevelt promised that, granted emergency
powers, he would have 250,000 men in camps by the end of July,
1933. The speed with which the plan moved through proposal,
authorization, implementation and operation was a miracle of
cooperation among all branches and agencies of the federal
government. It was a mobilization of men, material and
transportation on a scale never before known in time of peace.
From FDR's inauguration on March 4, 1933, to the induction of
the first enrollee on April 7, only 37 days had elapsed.
Logistics was an immediate problem. The bulk of
young unemployed youth was concentrated in the East, while most
of the work projects were in the western parts of the country.
The Army was the only agency with the slightest capability of
merging the two and was in the program from the beginning.
Although not totally unprepared, the Army nevertheless devised
new plans and methods to meet the challenge. Mobilizing the
nation's transportation system, it moved thousands of enrollees
from induction centers to working camps. It used its own regular
and reserve officers, together with regulars of the Coast Guard,
Marine Corps and /Navy to temporarily command camps and
companies.
The Army was not the only organization to evoke
extraordinary efforts to meet the demands of this emergency.
Agriculture and Interior were responsible for planning and
organizing work to be performed in every state of the union. The
Department of Labor, through its state and local relief offices,
was responsible for the selection and enrollment of applicants.
All four agencies performed their minor miracles in coordination
with a National Director of ECW, Robert Fechner, a union
vice-president, personally picked by FDR and appointed in
accordance with Executive Order 6101, dated April 5, 1933.
The administration of the CCC was unprecedented.
The same Executive Order that authorized the program and
appointed Fechner also established an Advisory Council. Composed
of representatives of the Secretaries of War, Labor, and
Agriculture and Interior, the Council served for the duration.
It had no book of rules. There were none. Never before had there
been an agency like the CCC. It was an experiment in top-level
management designed to prevent red tape from strangling the
newborn agency. Fechner, and later James McEntee, would have
their differences with the Council, but unquestionably, each
contributed greatly to the success of the CCC.
Fechner and the Council were aware that the CCC
was FDR's pet project. This attachment, in time, complicated the
Director's operations. Technically, Fechner held complete
authority. However, the President retained final approval of
certain aspects. Decisions as to the location of camps often
stagnated on the President's desk until he found time to act.
Nevertheless, Fechner proved to be an honest, fairly capable,
although often reluctant administrator. However, he was the man
for the job, and Roosevelt never regretted the appointment.
The program had great public support. Young men
flocked to enroll. A poll of Republicans supported it by 67
percent, and another 95 percent of Californians were for it.
Colonel McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, and an
implacable hater of Roosevelt, gave the CCC his support. The
Soviet Union praised the program…perhaps it saw a touch of
socialism. A Chicago judge thought the CCC was largely
responsible for a 55 percent reduction in crime by the young men
of that day.
By April 1934, the Corps, now on a firm foundation, faced the
beginning of its second year with near universal approval and
praised of the country. This young, inexperienced $30-a-month
labor battalion had met and exceeded all expectations. The
impact of mandatory, monthly $25.00 allotment checks to families
was felt in the economy of the cities and towns all across the
nation. More than $72,000,000 in allotments was making life a
little easier for the people at home. In communities close to
the camps, local purchases averaging about $5,000 monthly staved
off failure of many small businesses. The man on the radio
could, for a change, say, "There's good news tonight."
News from the camps was welcome and good. The
enrollees were working hard, eating hearty and gaining weight,
while they improved millions of acres of federal and state
lands, and parks. New roads were built, telephone lines strung
and the first of millions of trees that would be planted had
gone into the soil. Glowing reports of the accomplishments of
the Corps were printed in major newspapers, even in some that
bitterly opposed other phases of the New Deal. President
Roosevelt, well pleased with his "baby," announced his
intention to extend the Corps for at least another year.
The Civilian Conservation Corps in 1935 began
the best years of its life. Behind it, for the most part, were
early days of drafty tents, ill-fitting uniforms and haphazard
work operations. Individual congressmen and senators were quick
to realize the importance of the camps to their constituencies
and political futures. Soon, letters, telegrams and messages
flooded the Director's office most of them demanding the
building of new camps in their states. Eventually there would be
camps in all states and in Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. By the end of 1935, there were over 2,650 camps
in operation in all states. California had more than 150.
Delaware had three. CCC enrollees were performing more than 100
kinds of work.
Enrollees numbering 505,782 occupied these
camps. Other categories, such as officers, supervisors,
educational advisors and administrators swelled the total to
more than 600,000 persons.
Probably the greatest concentration of CCC
personnel was in the Sixth Civilian Conservation Corps District
of the First Corps Area, in the Winooski River Valley, Vermont,
in December, 1933. It covered a front of about 20 miles from
Middlesex to East Barre and five miles in depth from Montpelior
to Wrightsville. Headquarters in Montpelior, with 28 work
companies and one supply company - 26 white and three black and
all veterans of the Spanish-American and World War - together
with their officers, enlisted personnel and supervisors totally
more than 5,300 persons, occupied four large camps.
The Emergency Conservation Work Act made no
mention of either education or training. They were not
officially introduced until 1937 by the Act that formally
created a Civilian Conservation Corps. However, late in 1933,
after a number of recommendations were made, President Roosevelt
appointed Clarence S. Marsh, the first Director of Education, By
1934, a formal program had begun. It was destined to be
controversial and criticized throughout its existence. Even
Fechner was never too enthusiastic about the program, suspecting
that at camp level it might interfere with the work program.
This did not materialize, as only in the later years of the CCC
was training authorized during normal working hours.
Ultimately, the success - or failure - of the
educational program was determined by the initiative and
qualifications of the Educational Advisor stationed in each
camp. The attitude and cooperation of the camp commander was
also important. These programs varied considerably from camp to
camp, both in efficiency and results. However, throughout the
Corps, more than 400,000 illiterates were taught to read and
write. Since most of this training was on the enrollee's own
time, undoubtedly each gained that for which he worked the
hardest, be it high school diploma, learning to type, or wood
carving.
Although relief of unemployed youth had been the
original objective of the ECW, two important modifications
became necessary early in 1933. The first extended enlistment
coverage to about 14,000 American Indians whose economic straits
were deplorable and had been largely ignored. Before the CCC was
terminated, more than 80,000 Native Americans were paid to help
reclaim the land that had once been their exclusive domain.
The second modification authorized the
enrollment of about 25,000 older local men (called LEMS) who,
because of their experience or special skills, were vital to
train and protect the unskilled enrollee in his transition from
city greenhorn to expert handler of axe and shovel. Demands of
nearby communities that their own unemployed be eligible for
hire were also satisfied. Some complaints of "political
patronage" emerged in this endeavor, but no serious
scandals ever developed.
The appearance of a second Bonus Army in
Washington in May, 1933, brought about another unplanned
modification when the President issued Executive Order 6129,
dated May 11, 1933, authorizing the immediate enrollment of
about 25,000 veterans of the Spanish American War and WW1, with
no age or marital restrictions. These men were first housed in
separate camps and performed duties in conservation suited to
their age and physical condition. While not exactly what the
veterans had in mind when they marched on Washington, it was an
offer that most accepted. A total of nearly 250,000 got belated
opportunity to rebuild lives disrupted by earlier serve to their
country.
The years 1935-36 witnessed not only a peak in
the size and popularity of the Corps but revealed the first
major attempt to change a system which had proved to be workable
and successful since early in 1933. However, before this
challenge developed, Congress authorized funded and extended the
existence of the CCC until March 1935, with a new ceiling of
600,000 enrollees. This action left little doubt that the
"grass roots" and their representatives were more than
satisfied with the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps
At first, it appeared there would be no problems
in reaching the 600,000-man ceiling. However, a new name had
appeared among Roosevelt's advisors. Harry Hopkins established
new and uncoordinated ground rules for the selection of
enrollees. His procedure, based on relief rolls, effectively
ruined the quota systems in use by all the states. Fechner
protested violently, and the hassle that developed slowed down
the recruiting efforts and generated so much confusion that by
September 1935, there were only about 500,000 men located in
2,600 camps. Never again, during the remainder of the life of
the Corps, were there as many men in as many camps.
While Fechner was still struggling with the
changes required by the failure to meet the 600,000-strength
figure, he was struck by another change in strategy that spelled
disaster to him. Roosevelt quietly informed him to expect a
drastic reduction in the number of camps and enrollees in an
effort to balance the federal budget in an election year.
Roosevelt, a master politician, was aware that a major cut in
government spending would be an important selling point in this
campaign for re-election. However, in 1936 there were other
factors involved that he either ignored or had underestimated.
Election year or not, Roosevelt's proposed budget reform invited
trouble.
As soon as the proposed reduction was announced
the floodgates burst, and Congress was besieged with protests.
The Corps was at the height of its popularity. No one wanted
camps closed, especially those in his area. Republicans and
Democrats alike frantically sought a reversal of Roosevelt's
policy. The President was adamant. The plan would begin, he
insisted, in January, 1936. By June, he wished approximately
300,000 men in about 1,400 camps. Coincidentally, about this
time a few camps previously scheduled to close, did so. This
action brought another deluge of mail. Congress, sparked by
House Democrats, was in open revolt and was determined to take
joint action to maintain the Corps at its current strength.
Roosevelt and his advisors finally recognized the threat of such
an action as a threat to their whole legislative program and
wisely called a retreat. He advised Fechner that the proposal
had been dropped and that all existing camps and personnel would
remain in being. His own party had refused to let him economize
in an election year at the expense of the Civilian Conservation
Corps.
Despite a few problems, the year 1936 was a
success for the CCC. The projects completed had reached high
levels, all faithfully recorded and reported to FDR in Fechner's
yearly report. It was a proud record, added to each year, so
that in 1942, there was hardly a state that couldn't boast of
permanent projects left as markers in the passage of
"Roosevelt's Tree Army."
Some of the specific accomplishments of the
Corps during its existence included 3,470 fire towers erected,
97,000 miles of fire roads built, 4,235,000 man-days devoted to
fighting fires, and more than three billion trees planted. Five
hundred camps were under the control of the Soil Conservation
Service, performing erosion control. Erosion was ultimately
arrested on more than twenty million acres. The CCC made
outstanding contributions in the development of recreational
facilities in national, state, county and metropolitan parks.
There were 7,153,000 enrollee man-days expended
on other related conservation activities. These included
protection of range for the Grazing Service, protecting the
natural habitats of wildlife, stream improvement, restocking of
fish and building small dams for water conservation.
Eighty-three camps in 15 western states were assigned 45
projects of this nature.
Drainage was another important phase of land
conservation and management. There were 84,400,000 acres of good
agricultural land dependent on man-made drainage systems, an
area equal to the combined states of Ohio, Indiana and Iowa.
Forty-six camps were assigned to this work under the direction
of the U.S. Bureau of Agriculture Engineering. Indian enrollees
did much of this work.
Residents of southern Indiana will never forget
the emergency work of the CCC during the flooding of the Ohio
River in 1937. The combined strength of camps in the area saved
countless lives and much property in danger of being swept away.
They contributed 1,240,000 man-days of emergency work in floods
of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. Other disasters in which
the CCC participated were the floods of Vermont and New York in
1937 and the New England hurricane of 1938. During blizzards of
1936-37 in Utah, 1,000,000 sheep were stranded and in danger of
starvation. CCC enrollees braved the drifts and saved the
flocks.
Few records were kept of the sociological impact
of the 1930s on the nation's young men. Many had never been
beyond the borders of their state, and others had not even left
home. Yet, many would never return. They would choose to remain
in towns and villages near their camps. They married, raised
families and put down their roots, much as had other young men
in the migratory movements of past years. Those who did return,
many with brides, came back as successful products of an
experiment in living that had renewed and stored their
confidence in themselves and in their country.
The Civilian Conservation Corps approached
maturity in 1937. Hundreds of enrollees had passed through the
system and returned home to boast of their experiences, while
hundreds more demonstrated their satisfaction by extending their
enlistments. Life in the camps had settled down to almost a
routine, with work the order of the day, every day, except
Sunday. But, after the evening meal the camps came to life as
well over a hundred men relaxed and had fun. One building in
every camp was a combined dayroom, recreation center and
canteen, or PX. In this building, amid the din of Ping-Pong,
poker, innumerable bottles of "coke", and occasional
beers, were fostered friendships that exist to this day. This,
then, was the Civilian Conservation Corps that FDR tried to make
permanent in April, 1937.
There were many reasons why Congress refused to
establish the Corps as a permanent agency. At the time, most of
them were probably valid. But never were disenchantment, or
failure to recognize the success of the organization, a topic of
debate. To the contrary, in a vote of confidence, Congress
extended its life as an independent, funded agency for an
additional two years. Conceivably Congress still regarded the
CCC as a temporary relief organization with an uncertain future,
rather than as a bold, progressive solution to the continuing
problem of dissipation of our national resources. Whatever the
reason, this stunning contradiction was a personal defeat for
the President and a punitive restatement of congressional
independence.
Since his appointment during the hectic days of
1933, Fechner had been able to control the operation of the CCC
with but relatively minor challenges to his authority. However,
1939 would bring about a major challenge at a time when he was
struggling with internal problems brought about by changing
conditions both in the United States and Europe. The storm
clouds forming over England and France had already impacted upon
the economy of the United States with the result that, as jobs
became more plentiful, applications for the CCC declined. But,
again it was a sudden change in administration policy that
generated the most heat for Fechner and the Civilian
Conservation Corps.
One of Roosevelt's long-range plans was the
reorganization of the administrative functions of some federal
agencies. Congress had been reluctant to approve such a move
until early in 1939. After much debate, they finally authorized
a modified proposal. The Federal Security Agency (FSA) was
created to consolidate several offices, service and boards under
one Director. The CCC lost its status as an independent agency
and was brought into the new organization. Fechner was furious,
especially when he learned the Director, FSA, would have
authority over him. Appeals to the President were futile as FDR
believed the consolidation was desirable. In an angry protest,
Fechner submitted his resignation. He withdrew it later,
probably at FDR's request. This may have been a mistake as
Fechner had been in poor health for some time. Early in
December, he was stricken by a massive heart attack and died a
few weeks later on New Year's Eve.
The Civilian Conservation Corps began a year of
change in 1940. The death of Fechner was a severe blow coming at
a time when the war in Europe was emerging as the subject of
greatest concern to Roosevelt and the Congress. John T. McEntee,
appointed by the President to carry on as a Director, was as
knowledgeable as Fechner, having been his assistant since the
beginning. He was an entirely different personality without the
conciliatory talents of his predecessor, and none of his
patience. His appointment, strongly opposed by Harold Ickes,
another short-tempered individual, increased the friction
between the Department of Interior and Director's office and was
typical of the problems McEntee inherited and would generate. He
served in a different, uncertain atmosphere and received faint
praise for his efforts.
The Corps itself continued to be popular.
Another election year attempt by the President to reduce its
strength precipitated a reaction reminiscent of the
congressional revolt of 1936. Despite the well-meaning attempt
at economy, Congress, with an eye to the folks back home, added
$50 million to the CCC's 1940-41 appropriation and the Corps
remained at its current strength of about 300,000 enrollees.
Congress would never again be as generous. Other major problems
were developing within Congress, most related to the defense of
the country, and, inevitably, with each crisis, the priority and
prestige of the CCC suffered. Those congressmen who had opposed
FDR and all of his "New Deal" from the beginning,
gained strength, some even calling for termination of the Corps.
By late summer, 1941, it was obvious the Corps
was in serious trouble. Lack of applicants, desertion and the
number of enrollees leaving for jobs had reduced the Corps to
fewer than 200,000 men in about 900 camps. There were also
disturbing signs that public opinion had been slowly changing.
Major newspapers that had long defended and supported the Corps
were now questioning the necessity of retaining the CCC when
unemployment had practically disappeared. Most agreed there was
still work to be done, but they insisted defense came first.
Pearl Harbor had shaken the country to its very
core, and it soon became obvious that, in a national dedicated
to war, any federal project not directly associated with the war
effort was in trouble. The joint committee of Congress
authorized by the 1941-42 appropriations bill was in session
investigating all federal agencies to determine which ones, if
any, were essential to the war effort. The CCC, no exception,
came under review late in 1941. The findings of the committee
was a surprise to no one. The major report recommended the
Civilian Conservation Corps be abolished by July 1, 1942.
The CCC lived on for a few more months but the
end was inevitable. Technically the Corps was never abolished.
It was far simpler for Congress just to refuse it any additional
money. This the House did in June, 1942, by a narrow vote of 158
to 151. The Senate voted twice and then Vice-President Henry
Wallace, to break the tie, voted to fund the CCC. It was a
valiant effort, but it didn't work. The Senate-House conference
committee compromise finished it by concurring in the House
action in return for $8 million to liquidate the agency. The
full Senate confirmed the action by voice vote and the Civilian
Conservation Corps moved into the pages of history.
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Document Contents
President
Roosevelt wastes no time
Emergency
Conservation Work Legislation passes on March 31, 1933
Administration
of the CCC unprecedented
The
Program had great public support
In
1935 the CCC began the best years of its life
Program
modifications ensure success
1935
- Administrative changes influence enrollment
Corps
Accomplishment
Congress
never establishes Corps as a permanent agency
1940
- CCC begins a year that signals change
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